Scanlon acknowledges that a theory of promise and the treaty based on damages must take into account how these standards deviate from the illicit norms that generally govern morality and the law of injury:[10] including this promise and treaty, promises made to fulfill their promises – to meet the expectations of its promises – instead of simply compensating for the disappointed promises of lost dependence or merely warning against non-performance to minimize these losses; [11] and this contract law imposes an obligation on the publisher to confirm the expectations of the promised and not just to repay its lost dependence. [12] Scanlon defends each of these contract management rules by comparing the benefits they entail with the burdens they impose and arguing that, given the balance between them, it would be inappropriate for thieves who bear the burden of rejecting the rules and that promises can rightly benefit from the benefits of regulation. , as required by the formal structure of the theory of damage. [13] With respect to the rule that children are required to meet the expectations of promises and not only to warn them of non-compliance or compensate for their lost dependence, Scanlon argues that the benefits that promise to protect expectations of sola`s change are considerable[14] and that, given the conditions of mutual knowledge, etc. , are integrated into the overall representation of the promise. the burdens imposed by this rule on the beneficiaries of the promise are low. [15] Faced with this balance, Scanlon concluded, promises have reason to insist that their expectations be protected, and the Promisors cannot reasonably reject this rule of promise (Scanlon 1998: 304-05). Similarly, Scanlon argues, with respect to the legal application of promise expectations, that the benefits of law enforcement are considerable,[16] while the cost of opposability is much less. [17] Scanlon therefore concludes once again that, given this balance, no one could reasonably reject a legal regime that imposes contractual expectations (Scanlon 2001). As Rawls acknowledged in his 1958 essay «Justice for Fairness,» one way for the parties to resolve their differences is to apply negotiated solutions, such as those proposed by R.B Braithwaite (1955). Rawls himself rejected negotiated solutions for the social contract because he believed that these solutions were based on threat benefits and that «everyone is hardly a principle of fairness under its threat advantage» (Rawls 1958, 58n).